A Scholar on the Bench: A Conversation with Guido Calabresi by Barsotti, Vittoria
N e w  Y o r k  U n i v e r s i t y
Annual Survey
of American Law
A SCHOLAR ON THE BENCH: 
A CONVERSATION WITH GUIDO CALABRESI
Vittoria Barsotti
Reprinted from the
Volume 70 Issue 1
2014
nys70-1_cv_nys70-1_cv  3/2/2015  12:06 PM  Page 4
36095-nys_70-1 Sheet No. 57 Side A      03/04/2015   07:12:55
36095-nys_70-1 Sheet No. 57 Side A      03/04/2015   07:12:55
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYS\70-1\NYS111.txt unknown Seq: 1 24-FEB-15 11:39
A SCHOLAR ON THE BENCH:
A CONVERSATION WITH
GUIDO CALABRESI
VITTORIA BARSOTTI *
Vittoria Barsotti: This morning, while waiting to meet you for
our conversation, I was browsing among some of your works. The
book I started with is the one I love most, not because I think it is
the most important, but because it is closer to my interests and feel-
ings and probably also because it summarizes many facets of your
judicial philosophy. I read again the last page of A Common Law for
the Age of Statutes, where I found one of your most penetrating
sentences: “As a scholar, it is my job to look in dark places and try to
describe, as precisely as I can, what I see.”1 This is your job as a
scholar. What about your job as a judge?
I would like to go over some of the great ideas that you devel-
oped over the years in so many articles and books. In other words, I
would like to see whether these ideas have somehow changed since
you were appointed to the bench. As a scholar, you looked in dark
places; now, you probably have new and different tasks.
Guido Calabresi: Let me start telling you what Justice Hugo
Black, on hearing of Charles Black’s defense of absolutes in discuss-
ing torture,2 once said to me: “You realize, Guy, I cannot agree with
that.” A long time after that conversation I understood what he
meant: he could not accept the balancing of values because a judge
must consider values as absolutes, taking the real world in no con-
sideration. This is strange because to some extent, a judge must pay
attention to what goes on in the real world and many times takes
positions that he would not take as a scholar or as a politician. The
explanation lies in the fact that a judge is part of a system. The
judge must follow the law, but must also take into account, espe-
cially in an appellate court such as mine, the opinion of his col-
leagues. Many times I don’t agree with my fellow judges, but
nevertheless I decide not to write a separate opinion, concurring or
dissenting, because if I go along with them I may contribute to
* Professor of Comparative Law, University of Florence School of Law. Ph.D.,
University of Florence.
1. GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 180 (1982).
2. Charles Black, Mr. Justice Black, The Supreme Court, and The Bill of Rights,
HARPER’S MAGAZINE, Feb. 1961, at 63, 67.
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smoothing down their positions and eventually reaching a more
balanced decision.
Sometimes, then, a judge does not take into consideration “ab-
solutes,” but instead takes into consideration the system as a whole
and, because he is to some degree a lawmaker, makes “policy” deci-
sions. As a scholar, if I don’t agree, I am completely free to take a
different stand. On the other hand—in order to protect certain
fundamental rights—on some occasions a judge must recognize
“absolutes,” that is values that cannot be balanced one with
another.
In any case, whether the judge is a clear-cut absolutist or acts in
a more nuanced way, he always knows that his decisions have not
only an immediate impact on real persons but that they also have a
more remote impact on the law. The judge must take into account
how his decisions fit in the system as a whole. The scholar instead
operates in a vacuum and since he creates no precedent, he is com-
pletely free to express his personal ideas.
For instance, although as a scholar I think that courts should
have the power of updating obsolescent statutes; in some of my
opinions I have said that judges in our present system do not have
that power.
VB: You have just touched on one of the fundamental and
most fascinating issues discussed in A Common Law for the Age Stat-
utes: what happens to old and obsolescent laws—to laws that the
legislative body does not update for simple inertia or for political
reasons?3 In the book you suggest that courts should develop a judi-
cial power over statutes, slowly, and in a common law fashion, but
now, as a judge, you are denying this power.4
GC: In the book I talk about “subterfuges,”5 which are part of
the judge’s natural power of interpretation. When an act can be
interpreted by way of a subterfuge, I am free to use that subterfuge,
eventually citing analogous cases.
VB: But in this way you are not only using a subterfuge, you are
rather constructing and manipulating the statute in a common law
style so as to put it back in the common law mainstream.
GC: I could openly follow this approach, this method, only if
the legislative body had given me the power, but this is not yet the
case. Nevertheless, the judge can hold that the statute is vague and
consequently interpret it in a manner close to the common law. But
3. See generally CALABRESI, supra note 1.
4. Id. at 164–65.
5. Id. at 172.
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this is not honest interpretation and for this reason I consider it a
“subterfuge” and I am a harsh critic of those of my colleagues who
use such a kind of construction too often.
VB: This is very clear in the book, your choice is for candor.6
GC: As a scholar, I am always candid.
In hard cases, a judge generally chooses not to use subterfuges
openly, otherwise other judges would have to follow the precedent
and use the same subterfuge. In the end, a judge can use subter-
fuges only when he is able to hide this practice, and here I have to
go back to Justice Black and his response to Charles Black’s defense
of absolutes in discussing torture7: torture must never be admitted,
not even in very special cases. Admitting torture for special cases
would open a crack in the wall through which too many exceptions
could go. The judge who openly recognizes his power of updating a
statute ends up opening a crack in the system.
VB: I realize that you are trying to make me understand what
happened to the ideas of A Common Law for the Age of Statutes now
that you are on the bench.8
GC: The ideas are the same. What changes is their application.
I believe very much in roles. When a person holds a certain posi-
tion, he must follow the rules and duties of that position.
One of the most important things a judge must always remem-
ber is that his decisions have an impact on real persons’ lives. If, for
instance, a judge strongly believes in his theory but his fellow judges
on the court are not ready to follow it, the outcome can be negative
for the real person in the real world because the opinion of the
majority tries to “resist” that theory.
The second very important thing a judge must consider is that
his decisions make law. And if the opinion of a judge sharply con-
trasts with the majority, the result can be a court decision that is
more “extreme” than what is needed—both for the parties in the
case and for the development of the law.
VB: Let’s go on now to other ideas and to other seminal works
of yours. Let’s talk about economic analysis of law. Let’s take into
consideration The Cost of Accidents,9 One View of the Cathedral,10 and,
6. Id. at 178–80.
7. Id. at 173–74; see also Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 155 (1944)
(Black, J.) (explaining further why confessions obtained through coercive meth-
ods should never be admissible).
8. See CALABRESI, supra note 1.
9. GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALY-
SIS (1970).
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from a slightly different perspective, the volume Tragic Choices11 As
a judge, have you ever come to grasp with the theories expressed in
these books and articles? I have in mind a decision in which you
concurred in order to better explain your position and your theo-
ries based on economic analysis.
GC: One of my first decisions, Taber v. Maine,12 was strictly re-
lated to A Common Law13 and The Cost of Accidents.14 In that case, the
law was close to my theories and there was some room to maneuver
because we had to apply the law of Guam, which is the law of the
Ninth Circuit, which is also the law of California and thus common
law.15 My opinion was very good and completely coherent with my
theories to the point that Judge Posner said: “It’s Guido at his best.”
But I must add that the decision, even though a binding precedent,
is hard for other judges to follow.
VB: Give me the facts of the case.
GC: There was a car accident between two soldiers, one of
whom was driving while drunk.16 Two questions were important.
The first question was, “Can driving be considered part of the
military job of the soldier and therefore can the administration be
held liable for damages as respondeat superior?”17
California had followed an important decision of Henry
Friendly that cited my first works and followed my theories on eco-
nomic analysis.18 I was then able to refer explicitly to my ideas.19
Moreover, according to my theories, the administration was to be
held liable given the fact that drinking or not drinking is part of the
intrinsic behavior of a soldier, which is in turn part of the adminis-
tration’s responsibility.20 This is so true that after my decision the
rules on drinking and driving in the military were changed.21
10. Guido Calabresi, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of
the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972).
11. GUIDO CALABRESI & PHILIP BOBBITT, TRAGIC CHOICES (1978).
12. 67 F.3d 1029 (2d Cir. 1995).
13. CALABRESI, supra note 1.
14. CALABRESI & BOBBITT, supra note 11.
15. See Taber, 67 F.3d at 1033–42.
16. Id. at 1032.
17. See id. at 1033–37.
18. See id. at 1031 (citing Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 398 F.2d
167, 171–72 (2d Cir. 1968)).
19. Id. at 1034–35.
20. Id. at 1033–42.
21. See, e.g., John H. Dalton, Sec’y of Navy, A Holistic Approach to Curbing
Sexual Harassment (Feb. 4, 1997), available at http://www.defense.gov/speeches/
speech.aspx?speechid=622 (noting that “[in 1996 the Secretary of the Navy] estab-
lished a senior-level Standing Committee on Alcohol Abuse Prevention and Alco-
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The second question concerned the common law. Following
the Supreme Court’s Feres doctrine, soldiers could not sue the ad-
ministration for damages.22 Soldiers had to be considered as em-
ployees who can sue their employers only within the limits of
workers’ compensation.23 Because soldiers have insurance plans
similar to, though somewhat different from, workers’ compensa-
tion, they cannot sue the administration.24
But in the case at hand, the soldier suffered damages for which
the employer could have been sued under workers’ compensation
if he had been an employee.25 This was the right way of interpret-
ing the relevant statutes. But at the same time, I underlined that I
did not agree with the Feres doctrine, a doctrine that improperly, I
believe, was the result of courts misinterpreting statutory law just to
make it consistent with the common law.26
I could do this in Taber,27 but more often a case can be decided
in a very limited way and still reach a fair result. Such a minimalist
approach, however, often leaves unsatisfied scholars because it
misses the general picture. It does not say where the case stands in
the stream of the law.
In these cases the judge has two possible ways of reasoning.
In the first place, he may pretend that in order to decide the
case he must rule in a broad way. He will say more than is needed.
He will be an “activist” judge. I think this approach is wrong. The
judge must decide the case at hand without indulging in broad the-
ories. And this is especially true in a court like mine in which a
panel of three judges makes decisions that are strictly binding on
the other later panels. In my court, we can overrule a prior panel’s
decision only when we are sitting en banc—that is when all the
judges on our court hear a case—but this occurs very rarely. Under
the circumstances, it is very important that each panel does not de-
cide more than is strictly necessary. Pretending that a broad deci-
sion is unavoidable can create problems for the later judges who
will find themselves in the unpleasant situation of having to choose
hol Use Deglamorization in the Department of the Navy to provide assistance and
advice on matters and policies relating to alcohol use and abuse among sailors and
Marines,” out of which came two major programs to deal with alcohol abuse in the
Navy and the Marine Corps).
22. See Taber, 67 F.3d at 1037 (citing Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146
(1950)).
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 1042–44.
26. Id. at 1038–42.
27. Id.
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whether to disregard the precedent or follow it notwithstanding
what they believe is an incorrect result.
In the second place, the judge can openly write dicta. But this
practice can raise two sets of problems. How much can a judge say
in dicta without making the decision more obscure? Moreover, we
are a panel of three judges and if I write dicta, the other two must
take a position with respect to the dicta. The other judges must say
if they agree or if that part of the opinion belongs only to Calabresi;
in the latter case they might have to say that they don’t agree even if
they don’t have particularly strong feelings on the specific issue. I
must consider very carefully that if I insist on writing dicta, my fel-
low judges may well feel they have to disagree now, even if in the
future they might come to a position more in line with mine. Con-
versely, they might feel compelled to agree even if they are not en-
tirely convinced. Instead, if I write a separate opinion, concurring
with my own decision, I will first of all be able to explain where I
think the decision stands within the whole system of law. I will also
be able to explain more carefully my ideas and my theory about the
law without binding anyone in the future. My fellow judges will be
aware of my position and they will be able to take it into considera-
tion for the future. This is extremely useful.
VB: This is what you did in Ciraolo.28
GC: Exactly!
VB: If I remember correctly, in Ciraolo you wrote a concurring
opinion in which you explained punitive damages in terms of eco-
nomic analysis and you expounded your theory at length.29
GC: Yes. Posner, more or less at the same time, wrote a deci-
sion similar to Ciraolo, but he wrote his ideas not in a concurring
opinion but in the opinion of the court,30 because in the end, he is
more aggressive, more activist than I am.
VB: Through your concurring opinions you managed to be
scholar even on the bench.
CG: Careful! When I concur in my own decision it might seem
that I write as a scholar, but I am always a judge because the opin-
ion is strictly related to the facts of the case.
VB: Let’s move on. There is another extremely interesting the-
ory that I would like to discuss with you. In the 1991 Harvard Law
Review’s Foreword, you advanced the idea of postponement, of “sec-
28. Ciraolo v. City of New York, 216 F.3d 236, 242–50 (2d Cir. 2000) (Cala-
bresi, J., concurring).
29. Id.
30. Kemezy v. Peters, 79 F.3d 33 (1996).
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ond look.”31 I have labeled this new approach to judicial review as a
“soft” approach because I think that it is a kind of judicial review
that is very respectful of the legislative body. Have you ever had the
opportunity to use the “second look” method in your decisions?
GC: Yes. Generally, I have advanced my “second look” theory
in concurring or dissenting opinions. The case in which I have ex-
pounded my theory in more detail is Quill v. Vacco, an assisted sui-
cide case.32
In Compassion in Dying v. Washington, the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit had struck down as a violation of the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment a Washington State statute
regulating assisted suicide.33 The statute prohibited physicians from
prescribing life-ending medication for use by the terminally ill,
competent adults who wished to hasten their own death.34 Invali-
dating a law because it is in contrast with the Due Process Clause is
the most activist way of invalidating the law because there is nothing
the legislative body can do to resurrect the law.
Instead, in our case, Quill v. Vacco, my two conservative col-
leagues struck down a very similar New York statute holding that it
was in contrast with the Equal Protection Clause.35 This is ex-
tremely interesting because using the Equal Protection Clause as a
benchmark gives the legislative body the possibility of enacting the
law again in a wording respectful of the Constitution. My court
then, basing its decision on equality between those who could com-
mit suicide on their own and those who could only do so if as-
sisted,36 was more respectful of Congress than the Ninth Circuit.
In my opinion I affirmed that Quill v. Vacco was an appropriate
case for applying the “second look” theory.37 I wrote that we should
remand the case to the legislative body, we should advise the legisla-
tive body about the possible unconstitutionality of the law, and give
it the responsibility of deciding whether and how to modify the sus-
pect statute.38 I proposed a new doctrine, a new approach to judi-
cial review, which I could do in a concurring opinion.39 The other
31. Guido Calabresi, Foreword: Antidiscrimination and Constitutional Accountabil-
ity (What the Bork-Brennan Debate Ignores), 105 HARV. L. REV. 80, 104 (1991).
32. 80 F.3d 716 (2d Cir. 1996), rev’d, 521 U.S. 793 (1997).
33. 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996), rev’d sub nom. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521
U.S. 702 (1997).
34. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.36.060 (2011).
35. 80 F.3d at 725–31.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 731–43 (Calabresi, J., concurring).
38. Id.
39. Id.
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judges of my court in Quill adopted a more aggressive because they
directly and immediately struck down the New York statute as a vio-
lation of the Equal Protection Clause,40 even though theirs was not
as aggressive a stand as the Ninth Circuit’s.
Why did my colleagues decide the case in a way stronger than
what I proposed in my concurring opinion? Probably because they
believed they were following the Supreme Court, which was seem-
ingly heading in that direction. We are certainly not bound to fol-
low a presumptive and future decision of the Supreme Court, but it
cannot be considered too activist for a court to try to precede such
Supreme Court decisions.
The Supreme Court eventually overruled the appellate courts’
decisions and held constitutionally valid the assisted suicide stat-
utes.41 But it did so in such a confused way as to leave the door
open to other developments of the law. The Justices almost did
what I had suggested and left some room for the states’ legislative
bodies.42 The Justices adopted a subterfuge while I acted in a more
candid and transparent manner.
At the time, Charles Krauthammer, a very conservative journal-
ist, attacked the appellate court decisions, and especially my con-
currence, bitterly criticizing such new approaches to judicial review
as extremely dangerous practices.43 Krauthammer wanted the
courts simply to declare the statutes on assisted suicide valid.44 Be-
cause of his ideological position he did not want to force the legisla-
tive bodies to take a second look.
VB: But offering the legislative body a second chance is a very
moderate approach.
CG: Yes. It is a moderate approach, but for Krauthammer it
was a dangerous one. He thought that courts generally act with re-
straint before declaring a statute unconstitutional because such a
power is very strong and reserved to exceptional cases.45 If, instead,
courts have the possibility of asking the legislative body to take a
second look, then they might lose their restraint and feel too free to
40. Id. at 725–31.
41. Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S.
702 (1997).
42. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 718–19, 735 (noting that “the States are cur-
rently engaged in serious, thoughtful examinations of physician-assisted suicide
and other similar issues,” and stating that the Court’s holding “permits this debate
to continue”).
43. Charles Krauthammer, Physician-Assisted Suicides Should Be Decided by Public,
Not Courts, CHIC. TRIB., Apr. 15, 1996, at 17.
44. Id.
45. See id.
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press legislatures.46 This is not a very democratic way of thinking.
Krauthammer was clearly looking at the result and my approach led
to a result he did not like. As a journalist, he attacked me.47 The
whole story amused me very much because it revealed that
Krauthammer was criticizing not the supposed countermajoritarian
nature of the courts but only the merits of the decisions.
Another example of my use of second look is that of Maher
Arar.48 A terrible case. Arar, a Canadian and Syrian citizen, was
travelling from Switzerland to Canada and his plane had a stopover
at J.F.K. Airport in New York. Based on Canadian intelligence warn-
ing U.S. intelligence that Arar was a terrorist, American agents
picked up Arar at the airport and took him to Brooklyn.49 We don’t
know exactly how he was treated there, but we do know that he was
not given an opportunity to contact the Canadian embassy or a law-
yer, nor was he given the opportunity to return to Switzerland.50
The secret services sent him to Syria, via Jordan, where he was tor-
tured and confessed to many facts that were eventually proved not
to be true.51 He was in prison for a year.52 Finally, the Syrians ac-
knowledged that he was not a terrorist and let him go back to Ca-
nada.53 In Canada, an investigating committee made a serious
inquiry into the case and recognized Arar’s rights.54 I know a lot
about the investigation because Frank Iacobucci, a Canadian Su-
46. Id.
47. See id. (“The prize for judicial presumption, however, goes to Judge Guido
Calabresi of the 2nd Circuit in New York for his opinion concurring that the cur-
rent laws banning assisted suicide must be thrown out . . . .”).
48. Arar v. Ashcroft (Arar III), 585 F.3d 559 (2d Cir. 2009) (en banc).
49. See id. at 565–66.
50. Id. at 585 (Sack, J., dissenting) (noting that during his initial detention in
Brooklyn “Arar’s continued requests to meet with a lawyer and make telephone
calls were refused”). Initially, Arar was only given the opportunity to return to
Syria, which he refused because he was afraid he would be tortured there. Id. After
six days in detention Arar was permitted to make one phone call, to his mother-in-
law in Canada, who in turn alerted the Canadian Office for Consular Affairs to his
detention, and retained an attorney to represent him in the his removal proceed-
ings. Id. (“[Until] his family contacted the Office for Consular Affairs . . . . The
Canadian Consulate [was not] notified of Arar’s detention.”).
51. Id. at 586–87.
52. Id. at 587.
53. Id. at 566–67 (majority opinion).
54. See COMM’N OF INQUIRY INTO THE ACTIONS OF CANADIAN OFFICIALS IN RELA-
TION TO MAHER ARAR, REPORT OF THE EVENTS RELATING TO MAHER ARAR (2006),
available at http://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/206/301/pco-bcp/commissions/maher_
arar/07-09-13/www.ararcommission.ca/eng/AR_English.pdf.
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preme Court Justice and a very good friend of mine, was involved.55
Canada’s conservative administration, acting very correctly, as-
signed Arar damages for ten million Canadian dollars.56 Let’s leave
aside if sending people to torture is admissible or not. What is im-
portant is that when there is an error, that error must be corrected.
At this point Arar sued—
VB: —the United States, the federal administration—
GC: —those that “sent me to Syria . . . to be tortured,”57 as he
said. Arar filed a Bivens action—a special procedure for constitu-
tional violations.58 The trial judge held that Bivens was not admissi-
ble and the case was appealed to a panel of our court.59 At our
court, Judge Cabranes wrote an absurd decision.60 Cabranes de-
clared that a Bivens action is not admissible when other defenses
are possible (and this is true) and that there were many things an
immigrant to the United States could do to defend himself.61 But
Arar was not given time to defend himself anyhow! Moreover, he
was not an immigrant because he did not want to come to the
United States and, therefore, immigration law was not applicable!
Another judge on the panel, with my help, wrote a very good and
strong dissenting opinion,62 and our court decided to rehear the
55. See generally STANDING COMM. ON PUB. SAFETY & NAT’L SEC., REVIEW OF THE
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ARISING FROM THE IACOBUCCI AND O’CONNOR IN-
QUIRIES, 2009, H.C. (Can.), available at http://www.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/
Redirector.aspx?RefererUrl=%2fHousePublications%2fPublication.aspx%3fDocId
%3d4004074%26Language%3dE%26Mode%3d1%26Parl%3d40%26Ses%3d2&Re
directUrl=http://www.parl.gc.ca/content/hoc/Committee/402/SECU/Reports/
RP4004074/securp03/securp03-e.pdf&StatsEnabled=true. While Judge Iacobucci
was not Commissioner of the Arar Inquiry, he was Commissioner of a similar judi-
cial inquiry into whether Canadian officials had done enough to protect another
dual Canadian-Syrian citizen from torture in Syria around the same time. See id. at
4–5.
56. Arar III, 585 F.3d at 574 n.8 (citing Ottawa Reaches $10M Settlement with
Arar, CBC NEWS (Jan. 25, 2007, 9:06 PM), http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/otta
wa-reaches-10m-settlement-with-arar-1.682875.
57. Maher Arar: My Rendition & Torture in Syrian Prison Highlights U.S. Reliance
on Syria as an Ally, DEMOCRACY NOW! (June 13, 2001), http://www.democracynow
.org/2011/6/13/maher_arar_my_rendition_torture_in.
58. See id. at 563–64 (citing Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed.
Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971)).
59. Arar v. Ashcroft (Arar I), 414 F. Supp. 2d 250 (E.D.N.Y. 2006), vacated and
superseded on reh’g en banc, 585 F.2d 559 (2009).
60. Arar v. Ashcroft (Arar II), 532 F.3d 157 (2d Cir. 2008), vacated on reh’g en
banc, 585 F.3d 559 (2d Cir. 2009).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 193–216 (Sack, J., dissenting).
36095-nys_70-1 Sheet No. 62 Side A      03/04/2015   07:12:55
36095-nys_70-1 Sheet No. 62 Side A      03/04/2015   07:12:55
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYS\70-1\NYS111.txt unknown Seq: 11 24-FEB-15 11:39
2014] A SCHOLAR ON THE BENCH 111
case en banc63—a very unusual procedure. At the en banc level
many things happened. Sonia Sotomayor was appointed to the Su-
preme Court.64 The appellant hired a new counsel who was closely
related to one of the judges on our court, and who therefore had to
be recused.65 Another judge on our court went senior and was no
longer part of the plenum.66 At that point, the majority that voted
for rehearing the case en banc had changed, but we still agreed
that the panel’s decision could not hold because Arar was not an
immigration case.
We had to decide whether a Bivens action was available and
that was a constitutional question. The majority held that in cases of
political and international relevance Bivens was not available.67
Four dissenting opinions were written, each partly concurring with
the others.68 My colleagues primarily addressed the question of Biv-
ens actions and torture.69 In my dissenting opinion—which pro-
voked a great controversy because I wrote that in our court’s history
the day we decided Arar would be remembered as a bad day—I
wrote that the Bivens action might be permitted.70 But before decid-
ing on the availability of such an action, a preliminary question had
to be decided: whether there was a problem with privileged mate-
rial, a problem with state secrets.71 And in order to ascertain this
question, the case had to be remanded to the district court.72
Why did I do this? All the dissenting opinions agreed (and this
was also the opinion of the majority) that any decision on the availa-
bility of a Bivens action would be a decision at a constitutional
63. Arar III, 585 F.3d 559 (2d Cir. 2009) (en banc).
64. See id. at 562 n.*** (noting that Justice Sotomayor “was originally a mem-
ber of the in banc panel and . . . participated in oral argument [before she] was
elevated to the Supreme Court on August 8, 2009”); see also Oral Argument, Arar
III, 585 F.3d 559 (2d Cir. 2009) (No. 16-4216), ECF No. 189, available at http://
www.c-span.org/video/?282779-1/arar-v-ashcroft-oral-arguments.
65. See Arar III, 585 F.3d at 562 (noting that Judge Katzmann “took no part in
the consideration or decision of the case”); Oral Argument, supra note 64 (noting
in the docket entry that “Judge Katzmann is [recused]”).
66. See Arar III, 585 F.3d at 562 n.* (noting that before he assumed senior
status, “Senior Circuit Judge McLaughlin was a member of the initial three-judge
panel” that heard oral argument in Arar II); see also Oral Argument, supra note 64.
67. Arar III, 585 F.3d at 580.
68. Id. at 582–610 (Sack, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at
610–23 (Parker, J., dissenting); id. at 623–30 (Pooler, J., dissenting); id. at 630–39
(Calabresi, J., dissenting).
69. See id. at 582–610 (Sack, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id.
at 610–23 (Parker, J., dissenting); id. at 623–30 (Pooler, J., dissenting).
70. Id. at 630–39 (Calabresi, J., dissenting).
71. See id. at 634–37.
72. Id. at 605–610 (Sack, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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level.73 But a decision based on the doctrine of state secrets is a
decision based on common law and statute and therefore could be
changed74—and in fact the Obama administration seems inclined
to change the state secrets doctrine. Moreover, when a case cannot
proceed for state secrets reasons, it often means that the action is
well founded but cannot go forward precisely because of the state
secret. In such a situation, it’s easy for the trial judge to say, “The
action is good, but I cannot proceed.” This can put the administra-
tion under pressure, driving it towards a political solution “Cana-
dian style.” The administration will be pushed to pay damages to
the person whose rights are allegedly violated without going
through a judicial proceeding. In the end, a fair result can be
reached in the case.
VB: In a sense, with your opinion you would have encouraged
a political response.
GC: Yes. I would have encouraged and stimulated a political
decision. I was also trying to avoid a constitutional issue. I was trying
to avoid a decision on the significance of a Bivens action in a terror-
ism case, to avoid a situation where those who get excited when
dealing with terrorism issues would tend to limit the reach of Bivens
actions just because of the merits of the case.
In those two cases I was not successful. But there is a case in
which my soft approach to judicial review succeeded.75
Grand jury proceedings are secret.76 The administration may
publicize grand jury proceedings, but such a decision lies only
within the discretion of the administration.77 Nobody is entitled to
know what was said before a grand jury. We had a case in which a
historian wanted to know what a certain person said to the grand
jury during the anti-communist investigations of the 1950s.78 The
73. See Arar III, 585 F.3d at 631 (Calabresi, J., dissenting) (“[T]he existence ex
vel non of a claim meriting a Bivens remedy . . . is a matter of constitutional inter-
pretation.”); see also id. at 574 (majority opinion) (“Although this action is cast in
terms of a claim for money damages . . . it operates as a constitutional challenge to
policies promulgated by the executive.”); id. at 602 (concurring in part and dis-
senting in part); id. at 620 (Parker, J., dissenting); id. at 627 (Pooler, J.,
dissenting).
74. See id. at 605 (Sack, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
75. See In re Petition of Craig, 131 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 1997).
76. Id. at 101–02; see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)(2)(B).
77. In re Petition of Craig, 131 F.3d at 102 (“[D]istrict courts, as part of their
supervisory authority over the grand juries that they have empaneled, are explicitly
given the discretion to determine whether, if one or more of the listed exceptions
to grand jury secrecy apply, disclosure of records is appropriate.”); see also Fed. R.
Crim. P. 6(e)(3).
78. In re Petition of Craig, 131 F.3d at 101.
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administration denied the request arguing that all that is said
before the grand jury is secret; the trial judge ruled for the adminis-
tration.79 On appeal, I wrote a decision in which I noted that if
John Wilkes Booth, the murderer of President Lincoln, had not
been killed during his arrest and if he had gone in front of a grand
jury, historians, according to the government, would never be able
to study what went on before the grand jury.80 In my opinion I held
that a time must come when grand jury proceedings are to be avail-
able to the public in order to be studied for research purposes.81
But when is such a time reached? One might reasonably consider,
for instance, if people involved in the case or people who made
statements about the case are still alive. These issues are for the trial
judge to decide. In the case at hand, I read the trial judge’s decision
to be a discretionary one.82 In my view, the trial judge had simply
thought that the time had not yet come to open to the public the
proceedings of the grand jury of the anti-communist investigations
of the McCarthy era.83 The administration won the case and could
therefore not appeal to the Supreme Court, which was then not
able to decide the issue prematurely (as it seemed to me).
VB: But this is not a “second look,” it’s a shrewd move.
CG: It’s another way to leave room to different institutional
actors on difficult issues and I’ll tell you why. The losers did not
appeal because to a certain extent they were happy. What was in
fact the result of the case? The result was that many decisions were
taken on similar issues by various courts of appeals and all of them
followed my opinion84—that is they “stopped” the Supreme Court
and gave the administration only a “non-victory victory.” At this
point, the law is sufficiently clear. The grand jury, within certain
time limits, can be open to the public. This does not mean that it
will be impossible in the future for the Supreme Court to give a
clear-cut victory to the administration, but it will be harder. This is a
“second look” not regarding the legislative body, but regarding the
other federal courts. If the issue will one day reach the Supreme
Court, it will reach it as if Congress had already modified the law
admitting the possibility of opening the proceedings of the grand
jury. As a judge, I have learned that “second look” is a very sophisti-
79. Id.
80. Id. at 105–07.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 107.
83. Id.
84. See, e.g., In re Special Grand Jury 89-2, 450 F.3d 1159, 1178 (10th Cir.
2006); In re Sealed Case No. 99-3091, 192 F.3d 995, 1004 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
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cated theory. Generally, a “second look” is referred to the legislative
body, but it can also be referred to other judges and to
administrators.
VB: In any case, you leave a door open for dialogue.
GC: Exactly! I tried to initiate a dialogue among courts over
the issue of the grand jury. In this case my decision was successful
and this is the reason why nobody talks about it—it’s not interesting
because it’s not dramatic. The problem with judges is their vocation
for martyrdom, their temptation to write the great dissent, the great
concurring opinion, saying “everybody but me is wrong.”
VB: Here we go back to what you were telling me at the begin-
ning of our conversation. The good judge must take into account
the real case. In the situation that you just described, you took into
account both the real case and the development of the law.
GC: When a judge writes a dissenting or a concurring opinion,
he feels good because he writes for history. But he should not be
happy because in such a case he has not found the right answer and
has lost.
VB: Let’s change perspective. Once, in discussing how courts
should be free to decide—courts should be free to remand cases,
ask for a “second look,” decide prospectively—you mentioned what
some European constitutional courts are allowed to do.85 I am re-
ferring to United States v. Then where, looking at the European ex-
perience, you wrote beautifully, “Wise parents do not hesitate to
learn from their children.”86
GC: That’s one of the most quoted sentences from my
opinions.
VB: It’s a very famous case, in which you cited a Florentine
scholar, Mauro Cappelletti, and you acted like a true com-
paratavist.87 Tell me something about Guido as both a judge and a
comparatavist.
GC: First of all, I think that citing foreign countries’ law not
only is not a problem, as it is, for instance, for Justice Scalia, but it is
part of the fundamental task of an American judge because the
United States is a true federation. In our federation, values differ
very much from one state to another. Vermont and Texas have dif-
ferent values. Yet, from the very beginning of our history, not only
could one state refer to another state’s law, but that practice was
85. United States v. Then, 56 F.3d 464 (2d Cir. 1995).
86. Id. at 469.
87. Id. (citing MAURO CAPPELLETTI, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS IN COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVE (1989)).
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very common.88 Scalia declares that it’s not possible to quote an-
other country’s courts because that country’s judges were not ap-
pointed by the President of the Unites States with the advice and
consent of the U.S. Senate.89 The consequence is that for Scalia,
hard law is the only source of law.
But this was never true in our system because judges in Texas
or California are not nominated by Vermont’s governor and con-
firmed by Vermont’s senate, yet judges in Vermont have always
been free to cite opinions from Texas or California in order to de-
cide their own cases better. Vermont, in taking into consideration
other American jurisdictions, must look to “close” jurisdictions, to
jurisdictions with values similar to those of Vermont, regarding the
problem that has to be solved. But Vermont is also free to cite far
and culturally remote countries in order, for example, to verify
whether those countries have a different approach to a similar
problem.
What does “close” mean? Obviously two jurisdictions can be ge-
ographically close, but they can also be close from a systematic
point of view. For instance, New York and California frequently cite
one another because they are both Field Code States. This is true
not only for issues regulated by the common law, but also for consti-
tutional issues. Courts talk among each other but they must be care-
ful. For example: “Look! California has invalidated its guest statutes
as a violation of the state constitution.” And then Washington State
follows California and invalidates its own guest statutes. But it is very
different to declare a statute unconstitutional in California and in
Washington. In California, the Constitution can be very easily
amended.90
VB: And this is not the case in Washington.
GC: In California, a decision of unconstitutionality can be con-
sidered a “second look” vis-a`-vis a referendum.91 The second chance
is given not to the legislative body but directly to the people.92 The
situation in Washington is different. In the end, Washington’s refer-
ence to California is not proper. In order to follow another legal
88. See, e.g., Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506, 512 (1889) (referring to Connecti-
cut probate law); State v. Post, 20 N.J.L. 368, 377 (1845) (referring to the Virginia
state constitution); Merrill v. Sherburne, 1 N.H. 199, 214 (1819) (referring to Mas-
sachusetts common law).
89. See David J. Seipp, Our Law, Their Law, History and the Citation of Foreign
Law, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1417, 1418 (2006) (listing opinions in which Justice Scalia
“complained about the citation of foreign law”).
90. See CAL. CONST. art. XVIII.
91. CAL. CONST. art. II.
92. Id.
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system, one must be familiar with that legal system and be aware of
its complexity.
VB: When one compares, she has to know what she is doing.
GC: She has to know what she is doing. But, that said, she has
to do it as she has always done it. And many times it happens that
the more easily comparable system—because of its cultural and le-
gal similarities—is not within the US—
VB: —but is a foreign or a supranational system. It comes to
my mind Lawrence v. Texas, the decision that declared sodomy laws
unconstitutional,93 which was bitterly criticized not only on its mer-
its but also because it quoted extensively from the case law of the
European Court of Human Rights.94
GC: It can be that, for Maine or Vermont, Canada’s case law is
more interesting than that of Texas or California. For an American
judge, it is important and inevitable to be a comparatavist. But he
has to be a good comparatavist. Once I heard Posner saying: “It’s
true, Scalia’s position does not hold, but if a judge is allowed to
refer to any jurisdiction, he would gain too much power because he
will always be able to find the answer that he likes.” He made me
laugh because the issue that was debated was exactly if a judge
could do anything he wanted and Posner was saying yes and I was
saying no. This is how I concluded: “Well, for you, a judge can do
anything anyway. What, then, is the difference?”
In any case, if a judge is allowed to cite the fifty-one jurisdic-
tions of the United States, he will find everything he wants! It’s the
same old story. The judge must always be honest when he interprets
the law and this is just as much so when, in the interpretation, he
uses comparative law. Indeed, even when he uses subterfuges, he
must be candid.
VB: And here we are back to A Common Law for the Age of Stat-
utes and your “choice for candor.”95 I realized I have taken too
much of your time. We’ve been talking all morning. Is there some-
thing else you would like to add to our conversation?
GC: Let me add a few more words on federalism.
The position of my court, as a federal court of appeals, is
unique. It decides ordinary issues and constitutional issues and, in
the great part of the cases, it’s a court of last resort because the
Supreme Court almost never grants certiorari. Only in those rare
cases that reach the Supreme Court do we really act as an interme-
93. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
94. See Seipp, supra note 89, at 1417 & n.3.
95. CALABRESI, supra note 1, at 178–81.
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diate court of appeals. And we know very well which cases will reach
the Supreme Court. As intermediate judges, we are also able to con-
dition, to influence, the Supreme Court in deciding whether to
grant review or not. The Justices now tend to accept cases where
there is a conflict among circuits. Well, we can write a decision—
VB: —where you emphasize the conflict or not.
GC: I can say, for instance, that Judge Posner in Chicago has
decided in a certain way, but that the fact situation in New York and
Illinois differs very much, and what appears as a contrast probably is
not. This kind of decision signals to the Supreme Court that there
is no need to rush and suggests waiting for other circuits’ opinions.
To the opposite, we can emphasize that Posner said “black” and we
said “white,” and therefore that the contrast needs to be decided.
But there is more. When we think that the Supreme Court will take
the case, we write in a special way. We want to offer them a whole
“menu”; we want to help the Court to decide.
VB: This is a crucial point. You “prepare” the case in order to
influence the decision of the Supreme Court.
GC: We can even say, “You have gone in this direction, but we
think it’s wrong.” For example, a few years ago, in a preemption
case,96 everybody said about my opinion, “Ok, Guido. You’re right,
but the Court is going completely in another direction and you will
be reversed nine to zero or eight to one.” I answered, “No prob-
lem!” It happened instead that one Justice did not participate in the
decision, the remaining eight divided equally, and my opinion was
affirmed.97 Two years later, in a crucial case, my opinion was fol-
lowed because there had been a different development in the law.98
In the end, we also have the role of stimulating, of directing.
But we also have another role that is important when we apply
state law. As you know, in diversity jurisdiction cases we apply state
law—common law, statutory law, and constitutional law. When we
interpret state law, we act like intermediate state judges. This is a
very important part of American federalism.
VB: Yes. “There is no federal general common law.”99
GC: Precisely! And why is there no federal general common
law?
96. Desiano v. Warner-Lambert & Co., 467 F.3d 85 (2d Cir. 2006), aff’d sub
nom. Warner-Lambert Co., LLC v. Kent, 552 U.S. 440 (2008).
97. Warner-Lambert Co., LLC v. Kent, 552 U.S. 440 (2008).
98. See Holster v. Gatco, Inc., 130 S. Ct. 1575, 1577 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
99. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
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It’s a very interesting question because it brings us back again
to A Common Law for the Age of Statutes.100 Every state formally
adopted the English common law as the law of their jurisdiction.101
For instance, English common law, as elaborated by state courts, is
the law of New York—this is expressly provided by the New York
Constitution.102 In other states, the same result was reached by stat-
ute.103 State courts are delegated the power to develop English
common law; this was never the case for the federal government.
Therefore, as was held in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, there is “no
federal general common law.”104
In diversity cases, judges of most other circuits think they are
better equipped than their state counterparts, and therefore tend
to interpret directly state law. But probably one of the most impor-
tant things I did as a judge was to consider that “superiority” atti-
tude to be a wrong attitude. We must understand, I wrote, that in
diversity cases we act as intermediate state judges and as a result,
through certification, we must ask state supreme courts to interpret
their own law.
My position shocked many of my colleagues because they
thought that in so doing we would overburden state courts. But my
answer was: “Not at all!” If we say to state courts, “Give us the inter-
pretation!,” that could be offensive. If, instead, we emphasize that
we would be grateful if they gave us their interpretation, but that if
they choose not to, we would try to do our best in giving meaning to
state law, state courts would surely be collaborative.
This is what is going on, especially with New York State. Here
the great Chief Judge Judith Kaye understood my ideas and once
declared that the reason for such good relations between federal
and state courts was “Guido’s practice of certification.” My court
now asks state judges the meaning of their own law not only in di-
versity cases, but also in cases where the issue to be decided is
whether a statute is constitutionally valid. In Quill v. Vacco,105 I
hoped the case would not reach the Supreme Court. I would have
preferred to rehear that case en banc and, prior to the constitu-
tional remand that I proposed to the panel level, I would have
100. CALABRESI, supra note 1.
101. See Richard C. Dale, Adoption of the Common Law by the American Colonies,
30 Am. L. Reg. 553 (1882).
102. N.Y. CONST. art I, § 14.
103. See, e.g., Dale, supra note 101, at 572 (noting that Arkansas incorporated
the common law of England by statute).
104. 304 U.S. at 78.
105. 80 F.3d 716 (2d Cir. 1996).
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asked the New York court, through certification, the meaning of
the 1818 New York statute on assisted suicide. The New York court
would have been free not to answer our question, leaving us to in-
terpret the statute. The state court might have preferred to wait for
another case within its own jurisdiction before deciding the issue.
Or they might have preferred to answer our question. When we use
certification, New York judges can answer: “Yes, we are willing to
decide.” Or they can start a dialogue with us: “You decide first and
then we will be free to follow your interpretation or not.”
VB: In the end, if I try to put together all your answers, I can
see that Guido Calabresi as a judge has emphasized some aspects of
his original theories. As a judge, he is extremely open to dialogue
and his approach to judicial review is as soft as possible. Guido Cala-
bresi’s openness is addressed not only to the legislative body, but
also to other judges, federal and state. He has a dialogic attitude
towards any subject that interacts with his court.
GC: You are right. The legal philosophy that I tried to develop
is that of dialogue. And there should be a dialogue with state courts
not only on state law but also, in certain cases, on federal law.
VB: Would it be fair to say, by way of conclusion, that as a judge
you are minimalist, mild, and open to dialogue?
GC: Mild only to a certain extent. There are some constitu-
tional values that must be considered absolutes. In this I follow Jus-
tice Black: there are cases in which the Framers have given a great
power to courts, and in these cases that power must be used.106 But,
in general, you are right. Dialogue is a great part of my job as a
judge; it lies at the core of my judicial philosophy.
106. See Hugo Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 865, 880 (1960).
